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When the Council adopted the first set of procedural rules governing Article 7(1)
TEU hearings in July 2019, it unilaterally decided to make the Commission the
proxy for the Parliament. This post will show how the Council’s differential treatment
of the Commission and the Parliament as activating bodies under Article 7(1) is
not compatible with EU primary law and goes against in particular the principle of
institutional balance. 
The Council has justified the formal exclusion of the Parliament by hiding behind a
confidential unwritten legal opinion of the Council Legal Service (CLS hereinafter)
which, not for the first time (see here and here for a critical assessment of
the CLS opinions regarding the Commission’s ‘pre-Article 7 proposal’ and the
Commission’s rule of law budgetary mechanism respectively), one may find difficult
to comprehend. 
1. The mysterious legal opinion of the Council Legal
Service
There are at least four problems with the opinion of the CLS regarding the (lack of)
involvement of the Parliament in the Council’s formal hearings in the case of the
ongoing Article 7(1) procedure initiated by the Parliament itself against Hungary in
September 2018. 
First, the Austrian Presidency, during which the CLS opinion was given, never made
clear that the opinion was delivered, let alone orally (to our knowledge, the first
mention of the existence of the CLS opinion was made by Eszter Zalan). The lack of
a written opinion may be found extremely peculiar for a crucial procedural question
involving an untested provision of EU primary law on what is furthermore an issue of
the most fundamental importance.
Secondly, the CLS opinion has seemingly claimed that any formal involvement of
the Parliament would breach EU primary law according to a non-public document
(European Parliament, GRI Meeting of 26 October 2018, SI(2018) 579) obtained by
one of the present authors: 
[The CLS] expressed its strong reservations on any European Parliament
involvement that would go beyond the mere triggering of the procedure
and the granting of consent as provided in Article 7(1) TEU. It considered
that formal involvement in the work of the Council through participation
in meetings would violate the institutional balance, and that the only
acceptable interaction would be the provision of information by the
European Parliament.
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This position however deviates from the basic premises of procedural equality
between the institutions, a principle important enough, in the eyes of the Court, to be
reaffirmed even where the Treaties do not expressly allow for such equality, as the
Parliament itself experienced, acting as a respondent, in the case of Les Verts.
Thirdly, in addition to Hungary of course, only two – you read that correctly – national
governments (Latvia and the UK) expressed their full agreement with the CLS
opinion according to the same non-public document quoted above:
The ensuing discussion revealed divergent views in this respect: LV, UK
and HU fully supported the Council Legal Service opinion. EL, NL, DE, ES,
BE, DK rather suggested to find a way to involve the European Parliament.
EL welcomed input from the Commission, but cautioned against inviting
the Commission to provide input to Council discussions in place of a direct
contribution from the European Parliament. SE and FR expressed in
particular their concerns about the developments in Hungary. Hungary said
that it is fully committed to EU values and that it supports the Council Legal
Service opinion as regards the European Parliament’s involvement.  
Fourth, to this day, the Council is yet to give a publicly available digest of the main
legal arguments on the basis of which the CLS claimed that the EU Treaties would
(allegedly) preclude the Parliament from being able to formally present and defend
its Reasoned Proposal within the framework of Article 7(1) hearing(s). 
The irony is that the only legal argument to be mentioned in the document quoted
above – an alleged violation of institutional balance – is seemingly used to justify
the non-involvement of the Parliament when it is this non-involvement which, in our
opinion, actually breaches of the principle of institutional balance. This is possibly
the birth of a new method of legal interpretation of EU law which one may tentatively
label the “Trumpian method”. 
2. Violating institutional balance in the name of
respecting institutional balance 
By way of background, it is important to recall that at the time of the first hearing
of Poland under Article 7(1) TEU, the Council agreed to invite the Commission
to submit a written contribution in which it offered an update on the state of play
regarding the rule of law situation in Poland. In addition, the Commission was invited
to present an oral update at the hearing itself. This involvement of the Commission
before and during Article 7(1) hearings is entirely proper and the Council on this front
acted in a constructive way with the view of maximising effectiveness of Article 7(1)
procedure. 
By contrast, the Council, in the situation where the Parliament is the Article 7(1)
activating body, has decided to make its own Presidency and the Commission the
proxies for the Parliament against, one must stress, the Commission’s own position
and with no indication in the text of Article 7(1) TEU to this effect.
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The Council’s position, codified in a document adopted in July 2019 called “Standard
modalities for hearings referred to in Article 7(1) TEU”, means that only the
Parliament is treated differently and less favourably than the Commission but also
the Member States (when at least one third of them have decided to activate Art.
7(1) TEU). 
In addition to being absurd – the Commission in the case of Hungary is being
asked to represent the views of another institution when the Commission itself has
repeatedly refused to activate Article 7(1) – the Council’s position is also legally
flawed. 
As previously noted, and to begin with, Article 7(1) TEU does not provide for
any differences in procedural rights between the actors empowered to activate
this procedure. This position is furthermore at odds with the very principle of
institutional balance the CLS has apparently used to convince the Council to refuse
the Parliament any formal involvement within the framework of Article 7(1) hearings.
In the case of Chernobyl, the Court of Justice stressed that ‘observance of the
institutional balance means that each of the institutions must exercise its powers
with due regard for the powers of the other institutions’. In other words, institutional
balance means mutual respect between institutions as regards their respective
remits and attributions.
By preventing the Parliament to present and defend its Article 7(1) proposal or
subsequently present an update on the issues to be covered by any ensuing
hearing, it could be argued that the Council is exercising its powers with respect
to the organisation of Article 7(1) hearings without due regard for the power of the
European Parliament, since the power to activate Article 7(1) would be deprived
of any effet utile if the Parliament cannot explain its position and reply to the
arguments of the Hungarian Government. It may be worth recalling in this respect
that the Court’s case law has been historically extremely and rightly protective of
the prerogatives and the role of the Parliament. For example, in the Isoglucose
cases, the Court found that the consultation of the Parliament, when required by
the Treaties, represents ‘an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by
the treaty’. While the Article 7(1) procedure cannot be confused with a legislative
procedure, it is difficult to see how institutional balance could be used to treat less
favourably the Parliament than the other actors which are empowered to trigger
Article 7(1). 
Lastly, the exclusion of the European Parliament is also unquestionably problematic
as regards the principle of mutual sincere cooperation. Mutual sincere cooperation is
the inter-institutional extension of the originally vertical (i.e. between the EU and the
Member States) principle of sincere cooperation. The Lisbon treaty has confirmed
this horizontal extension in Article 13(2) TEU (‘The institutions shall practice mutual
sincere cooperation’). According to the case law of the Court of Justice, mutual
sincere cooperation must apply even in the silence of the treaties and in all actions
of the institutions. For example, the Court held that even when the Commission is
entitled to withdraw a proposal, it may do so ‘only after having due regard, in the
spirit of sincere cooperation which … must govern relations between EU institutions
in the context of the ordinary legislative procedure, to the concerns of the Parliament
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and the Council underlying their intention to amend that proposal’. In the field of
external relations, the Court has also established that, even though the Commission
is allowed to submit legal observations to an international court on behalf of the EU
without prior approval of the Council, the principle of mutual sincere cooperation
requires the Commission to consult the Council beforehand if it intends to express
positions on behalf of the EU before an international court. It seems therefore
reasonable to assume a fortiori that the same principle of mutual sincere cooperation
compels the Council not to treat differently and less favourably the Parliament when
it comes to the presentation of its Reasoned Proposal at the first Article 7(1) hearing
and the provision of updates at any subsequent hearings. 
This is why the Commission must be commended for repeatedly pointing out that
the Council should review its position and give the Parliament ‘the possibility to
present its case in procedures it has initiated’ so as to respect the principle of
institutional balance. As the Commission emphasised at the time of the first hearing
of Hungary, the Council must ‘ensure a fair handling’ of the reasoned proposal tabled
by Parliament. The Parliament is therefore right to demand its formal involvement
at Article 7(1) hearings, and the Council is wrong to claim that it is sufficient for the
Chair of the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE)
Committee and the MEP-appointed rapporteur to meet with representatives of the
Member State holding the rotating presidency of the Council (see letter from the
President of the Parliament to the President of the Council dated 17 September
2019).
3. Conclusion
It would be deleterious not to say an irresponsible distraction to see a Parliament
v. Council case arising out of the Council’s indefensible position as highlighted in
this post. In the light of the arguments above, the outcome of the case is a foregone
conclusion which is  bound to confirm that the Parliament is right to demand full and
equal treatment with other Article 7(1) activating actors. The Council ought therefore
to urgently revise its ‘standard modalities for hearings’ with respect to the Parliament.
As suggested by the Commission itself, the Commission cannot ‘be a proxy for the
Parliament’. Last but not least, the Council must commit to systematically publishing
any legal opinion produced by the CLS in relation to Article 7 proceedings. The
shame of an EU Member State falling far short of its obligations to uphold the values
of democracy and the rule of law cannot be allowed to inculcate a culture of opaque
procedures, hidden opinions and secrecy among EU institutions. Where Parliament
had stood to defend these values, it should not be forced to sit outside. 
- 4 -
